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Abstract— A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each other by forming a 
multi-hop radio network and maintaining connections in a decentralized manner. Security remains a major challenge for these 
networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of 
centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Protecting the network layer of a MANET from malicious attacks 
is an important and challenging security issue, since most of the routing protocols for MANETs are vulnerable to various types of 
attacks. Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) is a very popular routing algorithm. However, it is vulnerable to the 
well-known black hole attack, where a malicious node falsely advertises good paths to a destination node during the route discovery 
process but drops all packets in the data forwarding phase. This attack becomes more severe when a group of malicious nodes 
cooperate each other. The proposed mechanism does not apply any cryptographic primitives on the routing messages. Instead, it 
protects the network by detecting and reacting to malicious activities of the nodes. Simulation results show that the scheme has a 
significantly high detection rate with moderate network traffic overhead and computation overhead in the nodes.   
Keywords-Mobile ad hoc network (MANET), blackhole, packet dropping attack, malicious node, routing misbehavior, collusion.  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A MANET is a collection of wireless hosts that can be 
rapidly deployed as a multi-hop packet radio network 
without the aid of any established infrastructure or 
centralized administrator. Such networks can be used to 
enable next generation battlefield applications, including 
situation awareness systems for maneuvering war fighters, 
and remotely deployed unmanned micro-sensor networks. 
MANETs have some special characteristic features such as 
unreliable wireless media (links) used for communication 
between hosts, constantly changing network topologies and 
memberships, limited bandwidth, battery, lifetime, and 
computation power of nodes etc. While these characteristics 
are essential for the flexibility of MANETs, they introduce 
specific security concerns that are absent or less severe in 
wired networks. MANETs are vulnerable to various types of 
attacks. These include passive eavesdropping, active 
interfering, impersonation, and denial-of-service. Intrusion 
prevention measures such as strong authentication and 
redundant transmission can be used to improve the security 
of an ad hoc network. However, these techniques can address 
only a subset of the threats. Moreover, they are costly to 
implement. The dynamic nature of ad hoc networks requires 
that prevention techniques should be complemented by 
detection techniques, which monitor security status of the 
network and identify malicious behavior. 
One of the most critical problems in MANETs is the 
security vulnerabilities of the routing protocols. A set of 
nodes in a MANET may be compromised in such a way that 
it may not be possible to detect their malicious behavior 
easily. Such nodes can generate new routing messages to 
advertise non-existent links, provide incorrect link state 
information, and flood other nodes with routing traffic, thus 
inflicting Byzantine failure in the network. One of the most 
widely used routing protocols in MANETs is the ad hoc on-
demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol [1]. It is a 
source initiated on-demand routing protocol. However, 
AODV is vulnerable to the well-known black hole attack. In 
[2], the authors have assumed that the black hole nodes in a 
MANET do not work as a group and have proposed a 
solution to identify a single black hole. However, their 
proposed method cannot be applied to identify a cooperative 
black hole attack involving multiple malicious nodes. In this 
paper, a mechanism is proposed to identify multiple black 
hole nodes cooperating as a group in an ad hoc network. 
The is an extension of our previous work [3], which  is a 
modified AODV protocol that makes use of a data routing 
information table (Section III). Extensive simulations have 
been done for evaluating the performance of the protocol.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
discusses some related work in security mechanism in 
routing for MANETs. Section III gives an overview of 
AODV protocol and the cooperative black hole attack. 
Section IV describes the proposed security protocol and the 
associated algorithm. Section V presents the important 
results obtained in simulation. Section VI concludes the 
paper while highlighting some future scope of work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The problem of security and cooperation enforcement has 
received considerable attention by researchers in the ad hoc 
network community. In this section, some of these 
contributions are presented. 
The problem of securing the routing layer using 
cryptographically secure messages is addressed by Hu et al. 
[4], Papadimitratos and Haas [5], and Sanzgiri et al. [6]. 
Schemes to handle authentication in ad hoc networks 
assuming trusted certificate authorities have been proposed 
by Kong et al. [7]. Hubaux et al. [8] have employed a self-
organized PGP-based scheme to authenticate nodes using 
chains of certificates and transitivity of trust. Stajano et al. 
[9] have proposed authentication of users by imprinting in 
analogy to ducklings acknowledging the first moving subject 
they see as their mother.  
In contrast to securing the routing layer of ad hoc 
networks, some researchers have also focused on simply 
detecting and reporting misleading routing misbehavior. 
Watchdog and Pathrater [10] use observation-based 
techniques to detect misbehaving nodes, and report observed 
misbehavior back to the source of the traffic. Pathrater 
manages trust and route selection based on these reports. 
This allows nodes to choose better paths along which to 
route their traffic by routing around the misbehaving nodes. 
However, the scheme does not punish malicious nodes; 
instead, they are relieved of their packet forwarding burden. 
CONFIDANT [11] detects misbehaving nodes by means 
of observation and more aggressively informs other nodes of 
this misbehavior through reports sent around the network. 
Each node in the network hosts a monitor for observations, 
reputation records for first-hand and trusted second-hand 
reports, trust records to control the trust assigned to the 
received warnings, and a path manager used by nodes to 
adapt their behavior according to reputation information. 
Subsequent research has found that reputation schemes can 
be beneficial for fast misbehavior detection, but only when 
one can deal with false accusations [12].  
Researchers have also investigated means of 
discouraging selfish routing behavior in ad hoc networks, 
generally through payment schemes [13]. These approaches 
either require the use of tamper-proof hardware or central 
bankers to do the accounting securely, both of which may 
not be appropriate in some truly ad hoc network scenarios. In 
the per-hop payment scheme proposed by Buttyan et al. [14], 
the payment units are called nuglets and reside in a secure 
tamper-proof module in each node. The scheme relies on 
first-hand observations by the nodes. Directly observed 
positive behavior increases the rating of a node, while 
directly observed negative behavior decreases it by an 
amount larger than that is used for positive increments. If the 
rating of a node dips below the faulty threshold, the node is 
added to the faulty list. The faulty list is appended to the 
route request by each node broadcasting it to be used as a list 
of nodes to be avoided. A route is rated good or bad 
depending on whether the next hop is on the faulty list. If the 
next hop of a route is in the faulty list, the route is rated as 
bad. As a response to misbehavior of a node, all traffic from 
that node is rejected. A second chance mechanism for 
redemption employs a timeout after an idle period. After a 
timeout, the node is removed from the faulty list with its 
rating remaining unchanged. They have observed that given 
such a module, increased cooperation is beneficial not only 
for the entire network but also for individual nodes. The 
scheme can result in unfairness to some hosts, but its 
simplicity and performance may be appropriate in some 
cases. 
Bansal et al. [15] have proposed a scheme that relies on 
first-hand observations. Directly observed positive behavior 
increases the rating of a node, while directly observed 
negative behavior decreases it by an amount larger than that 
is used for positive increments. If the rating of a node dips 
below the faulty threshold, the node is added to a faulty list. 
The faulty list is appended to the route request by each node 
broadcasting it to be used as a list of nodes to be avoided. A 
route is rated good or bad depending on whether the next hop 
is on the faulty list. If the next hop of a route is in the faulty 
list, the route is rated as bad. As a response to misbehavior of 
a node, all traffic from that node is rejected. A second chance 
mechanism for redemption employs a timeout after an idle 
period. After a timeout, the node is removed from the faulty 
list with its rating remaining unchanged.  
In [16], a security architecture for MANETs has been 
proposed that involves mobile agents. In this scheme, 
multiple sensors deployed throughout the network collect 
and merge audit data implementing a cooperative detection 
algorithm. Sensors are deployed on some of the hosts in the 
network that monitor the network traffic. The selection of 
these nodes is based on the connectivity index and a 
distributed voting algorithm. The detection decisions are 
taken by mobile agents that migrate their execution and state 
information between different sensor hosts of the network, 
and finally return to the originator host with the results. The 
authors have proposed two different methods of decision-
making: collaborative and independent.  They argue that 
independent decision-making by mobile agents is susceptible 
to single point-of-failure problem and therefore, the 
collaborative method should be used. The main advantage of 
this scheme is the restriction of computation-intensive 
operations of the system to few dynamically elected nodes. 
However, most of the available mobile agent frameworks are 
heavyweight and can often be the targets of attacks 
themselves [17].  
Sen et al. have presented a scheme for detection of 
malicious packet dropping nodes in a MANET [18]. The 
mechanism is based on local misbehavior detection and 
flooding of the detection information in a controlled manner 
in the network so that the malicious node is detected even if 
moves out a local neighborhood.  Sen et al. have also 
proposed a trust and reputation-based mechanism for 
misbehavior detection of nodes in a MANET, in which every 
node computes the reputation information of its neighbors 
and exchanges the reputation information to make a 
cooperative detection [19]. 
Deng, Li and Agarwal [2] have suggested a mechanism 
of defense against black hole attack in ad hoc networks. In 
their proposed scheme, as soon as the RouteReply packet is 
received from one of the intermediate nodes, another 
RouteRequest is sent from the source node to a neighbor 
node of the intermediate node in the path. This is to ensure 
that such a path exists from the intermediate node to the 
destination node. For example, let the source node S send 
RouteRequest packets and receive RouteReply through the 
intermediate malicious node M. The RouteReply packet of M 
contains information regarding its next-hop neighbor node. 
Let it contain information about the neighbor E. Then, the 
source node S sends FurtherRouteRequest packets to this 
neighbor node E. Node E responds by sending a 
FurtherRouteReply packet to source node S. Since node M is 
a malicious node, and thus not present in the routing list of 
node E, the FurtherRouteReply packet sent by node E will 
not contain a route to the malicious node M. But if it contains 
a route to the destination node D, then the new route to the 
destination through node E is selected, and the earlier 
selected route through node M is rejected. While this scheme 
completely eliminates the black hole attack by a single 
attacker, it fails completely in identifying a cooperative black 
hole attack involving multiple malicious nodes.  
III. AODV AND ITS SECURITY PROBLEMS 
In this section, a brief overview of the AODV routing 
protocol is presented and the security threat that are 
associated with this routing protocol are briefly discussed. 
More specifically, the cooperative black hole attack on 
AODV is also described. 
A. AODV Overview 
AODV is a reactive routing protocol that does not require 
maintenance of routes to destination nodes that are not in 
active communication. Instead, it allows mobile nodes to 
quickly obtain routes to new destination nodes. Every mobile 
node maintains a routing table that stores the next hop node 
information for a route to the destination node. When a 
source node wishes to route a packet to a destination node, it 
uses the specified route if a fresh enough route to the 
destination node is available in its routing table. If such a 
route is not available in its cache, the node initiates a route 
discovery process by broadcasting a RouteRequest (RREQ) 
message to its neighbors. On receiving a RREQ message, the 
intermediate nodes update their routing tables for a reverse 
route to the source node. All the receiving nodes that do not 
have a route to the destination node broadcast the RREQ 
packet to their neighbors. Intermediate nodes increment the 
hop count before forwarding the RREQ. A RouteReply 
(RREP) message is sent back to the source node when the 
RREQ query reaches either the destination node itself or any 
other intermediate node that has a current route to the 
destination. As the RREP propagates to the source node, the 
forward route to the destination is updated by the 
intermediate nodes receiving a RREP. The RREP message is 
a unicast message to the source node. 
AODV uses sequence numbers to determine the 
freshness of routing information and to guarantee loop-free 
routes. In case of multiple routes, a node selects the route 
with the highest sequence number. If multiple routes have 
the same sequence number, then the node chooses the route 
with the shortest hop count. Timers are used to keep the 
route entries fresh. When a link break occurs, RouteError 
(RERR) packets are propagated along the reverse path to the 
source invalidating all broken entries in the routing table of 
the intermediate nodes. AODV also uses periodic hello 
messages to maintain the connectivity of neighboring nodes. 
AODV does not incorporate any specific security 
mechanism, such as strong authentication. Therefore, there is 
no straightforward mechanism to prevent mischievous 
behavior of a node such as MAC spoofing, IP spoofing, 
dropping packets, or altering the contents of the control 
packets. Protocols like SAR [20] have been developed to 
secure AODV against certain types of attacks. However, 
these protocols achieve limited security at the cost of 
performance degradation in terms of message overhead and 
latency time. 
B. Cooperative Black Hole Attack 
The blackhole attack has two phases. In the first phase, the 
malicious node exploits the ad hoc routing protocol such as 
AODV to advertise itself as having a valid route to a destination 
node, with the intention of intercepting packets, even though the 
route is spurious. In the second phase, the attacker node drops the 
intercepted packets without forwarding them. There is a more 
subtle form of this attack when an attacker node suppresses or 
modifies packets originating from some nodes, while leaving the 
data packets from other nodes unaffected. This makes it difficult 
for other nodes to detect the malicious node. In this work, 
however, a defense mechanism has been proposed against a 
cooperative blackhole attack in a MANET that relies on 
AODV routing protocol. Symbolic notations in Figure 1 are 
used in all the subsequent diagrams in the paper. 
In the standard AODV protocol, when the source node S 
(Figure 2) wants to communicate with the destination node 
D, the source node S broadcasts the RouteRequest (RREQ) 
packet. Each neighboring active node updates its routing 
table with an entry for the source node S, and checks if it is 
the destination node or whether it has the current route to the 
destination node. If an intermediate node does not have the 
current route to the destination node, it updates the RREQ 
packet by increasing the hop count, and floods the network 
with the RREQ to the destination node D until it reaches 
node D or any other intermediate node that has the current 
route to D, as depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
   Figure 1. Symbolic notations used in diagrams 
The destination node D or any intermediate node that has the 
current route to D, initiates a RouteReply (RREP) in the reverse 
direction, as depicted in Figure 3. Node S starts sending data 
packets to the neighboring node that responded first, and 
discards the other responses. This works fine when the 
network has no malicious nodes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Network flooding by RREQ messages 
In [2], authors have proposed a solution to identify and 
isolate a single blackhole node. However, the security threat 
arising out of the situation where multiple blackhole nodes 
act in coordination has not been addressed. For example, 
when multiple blackhole nodes are acting in coordination 
with each other, the first black hole node B1 refers to one of 
its partners B2 as the next hop, as depicted in Figure 2. In the 
mechanism propose in [2], the source node S sends a 
FurtherRequest (FRq) to B2 through a different route (S 2 
4 B2) other than via B1. Node S asks B2 if it has a route 
to node B1 and a route to destination node D. Because B2 is 
cooperating with B1, its “FurtherReply (FRp)” will be “yes” 
to both the questions. According to the solution proposed in 
[2], node S starts sending the data packets assuming that the 
route S-B1-B2 is secure. However, in reality, the packets are 
intercepted and then dropped by node B1 and the security of 
the network is compromised. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Propagation of RREP messages 
IV. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
Before you begin to format your paper, first write and 
save the content as a separate text file. In this, section the 
proposed mechanism for defending against a cooperative black 
hole attack is presented. The mechanism modifies the AODV 
protocol by introducing two concepts, (i) data routing 
information (DRI) table and (ii) cross checking.  
 
    
 
Figure 4. Modified AODV protocol to prevent cooperative black-hole 
attack 
A. Data Routing Information 
In the proposed scheme, two bits of additional 
information are sent by the nodes that respond to the RREQ 
message of a source node during route discovery process. 
Each node maintains an additional data routing information 
(DRI) table. In the DRI table, the bit 1 stands for ‘true’ and 
the bit 0 stands for ‘false’. The first bit ‘From’ stands for the 
information on routing data packet from the node (in the 
Node filed), while the second bit ‘Through’ stands for 
information on routing data packet through the node (in the 
Node field). With reference to the example depicted in 
Figure 3, a sample database maintained by node 4 is shown 
in Table 1. The entry 1 0 for node 3 implies that node 4 has 
routed data packets from 3, but has not routed any data 
packets through 3 (before node 3 moved away from 4). The 
entry 1 1 for node 6 implies that, node 4 has successfully 
routed data packets from and through node 6. The entry 0 0 
for node B2 implies that, node 4 has not routed any data 
packets from or through B2. 
 
TABLE I.  DRI TABLE MAINTAINED IN NODE 4 
Node # Data Routing  Information 
From Through 
3 1 0 
6 1 1 
B2 0 0 
2 1 1 
B. Cross Checking 
The proposed scheme relies on reliable nodes (nodes through 
which source has routed data previously and knows them to be 
trustworthy) to transfer data packets. The modified AODV 
protocol and the algorithm for the proposed mechanism are 
depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively.  
 
    
Figure 5. Modified AODV algorithm to detect co-operative black-hole 
attack 
In the modified protocol, the source node (SN) broadcasts 
a RREQ message to discover a secure route to the destination 
node. The intermediate node (IN) that generates the RREP 
has to provide information regarding its next-hop node 
(NHN) and its DRI entry for that NHN. 
Upon receiving the RREP message from IN, SN will 
check its own DRI table to see whether IN is its reliable 
node. If SN has used IN before for routing data packets, then 
IN is a reliable node for SN and SN starts routing data 
through IN. Otherwise, IN is unreliable and thus SN sends 
FRq message to NHN to check the identity of the IN, and 
asks NHN about the following information: (i) if IN has 
routed data packets through NHN, (ii) who is the current 
NHN’s next hop to destination, and (iii) has the current NHN 
routed data through its own next hop. The NHN, in turn, 
responds with FRp message including the following 
responses: (i) DRI entry for IN, (ii) the information about its 
(NHN’s) next hop node, and (iii) the DRI entry for its 
(NHN’s) next hop. Based on the FRp message from NHN, 
SN checks whether NHN is reliable or not. If SN has routed 
data through NHN before, NHN is reliable; otherwise, NHN 
is unreliable for SN. If NHN is reliable, then SN will check 
whether IN is a blackhole or not. If the second bit of the DRI 
entry from the IN is equal to 1, i.e. IN has routed data 
through NHN, and the first bit of the DRI entry from the 
NHN is equal to 0 i.e. NHN has not routed data from IN, 
then IN is a blackhole. If IN is not a blackhole and NHN is a 
reliable node, then the route is secure, and SN will update its 
DRI entry for IN with 0 1, and starts routing data via IN. If 
IN is a blackhole, then SN identifies all the nodes along the 
reverse path from IN to the node that generated the RREP as 
blackhole nodes. Subsequently SN ignores any other RREP 
from the black-holes and broadcasts the list of cooperative 
black-holes in the network. If NHN is an unreliable node, SN 
treats current NHN as IN and sends FRq to the updated IN’s 
next hop node and goes on in a loop from steps 7 through 24 
in the algorithm depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Detection of multiple black-hole nodes in one-time check 
As an example, let’s consider the network in Figure 6. 
When node B1 responds to source node S with RREP 
message, it provides its next hop node B2 and DRI for the 
next hop (i.e. if B1 has routed data packets through B2). Here 
the blackhole node (B1) lies about using the path by replying 
with the DRI value equal to 0 1. Upon receiving RREP 
message from B1, the source node S checks its own DRI table 
to see whether B1 is a reliable node. Since S has never sent 
any data through B1 before, B1 is not a reliable node to S. 
Therefore, S sends FRq to B2 via alternative path S  2  4 
 B2 and asks B2 about three things: (i) whether B2 has 
routed any data from B1, (ii) who is B2’s next hop, and (iii) 
whether B2 has routed data packets through B2’s next hop. 
Since B2 is maliciously collaborating with B1, it replies 
positively to all the three queries and gives node 6 (chosen 
randomly) as its next hop. When the source node contacts 
node 6 via alternative path S  2  4  6 to cross check 
the validity of the claims of node B2, node 6 responds 
negatively. Since node 6 has neither a route to node B2 nor it 
has received data packets from node B2, the DRI value 
corresponding to B2 as stored in node 6 is 0 0 as shown in 
Figure 6. Based on this information, node S can infer that B2 
is a blackhole node. If node B1 really had routed data packets 
through node B2 before, it should have validated the node 
(B2) before sending it. Now, since node B2 is invalidated 
through node 6, the source node S infers that node B1 is 
maliciously cooperating with node B2. Hence both nodes B1 
and B2 are marked as blackhole nodes and this information is 
propagated throughout leading to the revocation of their 
certificates. Subsequently S discards any further responses 
from B1 or B2 and looks from a valid alternative route to D. 
The process of cross checking the intermediate nodes is a 
one-time procedure which should be affordable for the purpose 
of security. The cost of crosschecking the nodes can be 
minimized by allowing the nodes to share the DRI table of their 
trusted nodes with each other. 
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
The experiments for the evaluation of the proposed 
scheme have been carried out using the network simulator 
ns-2. The 802.11 MAC layer implemented in ns-2 is used for 
simulation. An improved version of random waypoint model 
is used as the model of node mobility [21]. Performances of 
the three protocols are evaluated: (i) Standard AODV 
protocol, (ii) AODV with two malicious nodes cooperating 
in a blackhole attack, and (iii) AODV with the proposed 
algorithm. The scenarios developed to carry out the tests use 
two parameters: (i) the mobility of the nodes and (ii) the 
number of active connections in the network. The chosen 
parameters for simulation are presented in Table II.  
 
TABLE II.  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Parameter Value 
Simulation duration 
Simulation area 
Number of mobile nodes 
Transmission range 
Movement model 
Maximum speed 
Traffic type 
Total number of flows 
Packet rate 
Data payload 
Number of malicious nodes 
Host pause time  
1000 sec 
1000 * 1000 m 
30 
200 m 
Random waypoint 
5 – 20 m /sec 
CBR (UDP) 
15 
2 packets / sec 
512 bytes / packet 
2 
10 sec 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Packet delivery ratio vs. no. of active connections 
Following metrics are chosen to evaluate the impact of 
the blackhole attack on the simulated network: (i) packet 
delivery ratio and (ii) false routing packets sent by the 
attacker nodes. These metrics were used to measure the 
severity of the attack and the improvement that the scheme 
manages to achieve during an active attack scenario. Every 
point in the graph (Figures 7-10) is an average of the values 
obtained after the experiment is repeated five times. 
In Figure 7, the metric packet delivery ratio is plotted 
against the number of active connections. As the total 
number of mobile nodes in the network is 30, the maximum 
number of connections in the network is 29. A general 
observation from Figure 7 is that AODV achieves maximum 
delivery ratio with 10 to 25 active connections. However the 
delivery ratio falls slightly when the maximum number of 
connections (in this case 29) is established. The cooperative 
blackhole attack has a very severe impact as it decreases the 
delivery ratio to a value that is even less than half of the 
normal AODV delivery ratio. With the proposed scheme, the 
delivery ratio obtained is around 60%, which is a significant 
improvement over the degraded performance of the network 
under cooperative blackhole attack without any security 
mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 8. Delivery ratio vs. nodes’ mobility 
In Figure 8, packet delivery ratio is plotted against the 
mobility of the nodes. It is observed that AODV performs 
better for lower node mobility rates. The delivery rate starts 
dropping with increasing mobility of the nodes. The 
performance of the network significantly reduces when 
AODV is under the cooperative blackhole attack, and when 
the mobility of the nodes in the network increases. This 
behavior of the protocol is expected due to the following 
reason. With increasing mobility of the nodes the topology of 
the network changes faster, resulting in frequent route 
request generation. This gives an opportunity to a malicious 
node to send more false RREP packets. AODV under 
blackhole attack exhibits a decrease in delivery ratio to 38%. 
The proposed algorithm increases the delivery ratio to 55%, 
resulting in an average improvement of 17%. 
The second metric that is used in the evaluation of the attack 
is the number of false packets sent by the attacker nodes versus 
the number of active connections in the network. This metric has 
been used to examine the overhead of the blackhole attack. From 
Figure 9, it is observed that the average number of false 
RREPs sent by the malicious nodes in all the experiments 
conducted was 2056, and the number of nodes that inserted 
the false route into their routing table was 22 out of the total 
30 nodes. Figure 10 shows that with the increase in the 
mobility, the number of false RREP packets sent by the 
malicious nodes also increases. 
  
Figure 9. No. of false replies from attacker nodes vs. no. of connections 
 
Figure 10. No. of false replies sent by attacker nodes vs. nodes’ mobility 
In order to further study the performance of the scheme 
under varying number of black-hole nodes, the percentages of 
black-hole nodes are varied from 0% to 20%  and performance 
of the protocol is measured with respect to four parameters: (i) 
false positive rate, i.e., the probability of incorrectly identifying 
an honest node as malicious, (ii) false negative rate, i.e., the 
probability of failure in detecting a malicious node, (iii) data 
packet delivery ratio, i.e., the percentage of data packets that is 
successfully delivered, and (iv) communication overhead due to 
control packets of the security algorithm.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. False positive rate vs. nodes’ mobility 
Figure 11 shows how false positive rate varies with the 
mobility of the nodes for different percentages of black-hole 
nodes in the network. The maximum value of observed false 
positive rate is found to be 7%. The false positive rate increases 
as the nodes move faster. If a node constantly moves at a high 
speed, it can gather only partial information about its 
transmissions with the current neighbors. As a result, it is more 
likely to make errors in detection.  
 
       
Figure 12. Misdetection (false negative) rate vs. nodes’ mobility 
Figure 12 depicts the variation of false negative rate with 
nodes’ mobility for different percentages of black-hole nodes. It 
is seen that false negative rate is maximum (12%) in a static 
network which starts dropping with the mobility of the nodes. 
This is because in a static network if a black hole remains in a 
sparsely populated region, its neighbors may not be able to 
punish it since there may not be requisite k number of nodes to 
arrive at the consensus. On the contrary, in a mobile network, the 
mobility increase the probability that other nodes roam into the 
region of black hole node(s), or the black hole node(s) enters into 
a densely populated region. As a result, it is less likely that a 
black-hole would be able to escape without being detected.  
 
 
           
Figure 13. Data packet delivery rate vs. no. of black-holes 
Figure 13 shows how the data packet delivery ratio varies 
with respect to the number of black-hole nodes for the base 
AODV protocol, and for the proposed secure routing protocol. It 
is observed that even when20% of the nodes in the network are 
malicious black-holes, the percentage of packets successfully 
delivered is more than 90%, if the proposed security protocol is 
utilized. However, 100% packet delivery ratio is not achieved 
even with the proposed security protocol. A careful analysis of 
the trace files has shown that most of the packet loss occurs 
during the detection and reaction phase of the algorithm. 
 
         
Figure 14. Control packet overhead due to different no. of data packets 
Figure 14 shows the communication overhead due the 
control packet exchanges in the security protocol. It has been 
observed that with the increase in number of black-hole nodes, 
the overhead increases. The result for the worst case has been 
reported in Figure 14, in which case the percentage of malicious 
node is 20%. The communication overhead is as shown as the 
percentage of the number of control packets required to route 
different number of data packets in the network.  The 
performance of the plain AODV is taken as the baseline. It is 
observed that the overhead due to the proposed security 
mechanism decreases as the number of data packets transmitted 
is increased. This clearly demonstrates that the scheme is 
efficient and has a low communication overhead.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, routing security issues in MANETs are 
discussed in general, and in particular the cooperative 
blackhole attack has been described in detail. A security 
protocol has been proposed that can be utilized to identify 
multiple blackhole nodes in a MANET and thereby identify a 
secure routing path from a source node to a destination node 
avoiding the blackhole nodes. The proposed scheme has 
been evaluated by implementing it in the network simulator 
ns-2, and the results demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
mechanism. As a future scope of work, the proposed security 
mechanism may be extended so that it can defend against 
other attacks like resource consumption attack and packet 
dropping attack, grey-hole attack etc.  
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